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I. Introduction
It is now generally recognized that special interest group
influence on economic decision making is not in theory a phenomenon
restricted to democratic capitalism. Governments which have attained
power by non-democratic means must eventually seek legitimacy, either
by populist appeals to the masses or by cultivating the support of
important sectors (e.g. Lovell (1975)). They may therefore be no
less immune to interest group lobbying than governments which face
electoral scrutiny. Likewise, it has been argued that the incentive
for interest groups to exert political pressure is in fact greater
under socialism than under capitalism (e.g. Becker (1983)). The pur-
pose of this paper is to present evidence on the role of special
interest groups in economic policy making in the Republic of Korea
(South Korea), a country which differs from a western capitalist
democracy in at least one important respect.
The South Korean economy is by and large capitalist, although
perhaps more than most economies so described it is subject to
various forms of government intervention, regulation and guidance.
However, for the last two decades Korea has had a highly centralized,
authoritarian form of government. There have been constitutional
provisions -for the democratic election of both the President and
representatives to. the National Assembly, or parliament. Neverthe-
less, the overwhelming bulk of political power has rested with the
President, while the function of the National Assembly has been
primarily to debate, but ultimately to pass legislation initiated
by the President. Furthermore, the last two important transitions
of Presidential power have not been by the electoral process but
by military coup (President Park Chung-hee in 1961 and President
2
Chun Doo-hwan in 1980). Thus while electoral scrutiny might not
See Wright (1975), Hahn (1975) and Korean Overseas Information
Service (1981) for descriptions of the Korean constitution and
authority structure. Jones and Sakong ; (1980) also provide a good
description of the power channels of economic policy making through
the Presidency and bureaucracy during the Park era.
2
Park's Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah served briefly as President in
the transition period following Park's assassination in October
1979.
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seem to have been a binding constraint on government policy making,
the need for each military-turned-civilian government to gain legi-
timacy has potentially given interest groups an (additional) channel
of influence.
From an economic viewpoint, it is important to identify in-
terest group influence on government decision making in order to
understand the constraints that political considerations may place
on the economic policy making process. The prime concern of econo-
mists may be with policy packages which provide net gains to society
as a whole. Special interest groups, whose primary concern is with
the distribution of benefits rather than with the magnitude of the
overall gain, can constrain policy choices in the following ways.
Firstly, they can lobby decision makers to implement measures which
benefit their group but impose a net loss on society. Secondly, they
can lobby to block the implementation of measures which would hurt
their group but benefit society as a whole. Thus government may
adopt initiatives which are suboptimal from a purely economic view-
point but nevertheless represent an equilibrium outcome in the po-
litico-economic marketplace.
In order to identify the existence of interest group pressure,
however, it is not sufficient merely to identify the gainers and
losers from a particular set of policy choices and to impute the
outcome to successful lobbying on the part of the gainers. Even
where policies do provide net gains to society, the benefits are
rarely distributed evenly. More typically, some groups gain while
others lose, although economists are usually careful to show that
the gainers could potentially compensate the losers and still remain
better off. Similarly, the adoption of policies which apparently
impose a net efficiency loss may reflect a second best choice in the
face of some existing, irreversible market distortion (including per-
haps the implementation costs of a first best policy choice), rather
than the influence of special interest groups.
3
 See Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Becker (1983) and our own
paper Dee (1984b) for theoretical approaches to this process.
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In addition to this general identification problem, there are
several historical and cultural factors which make the search for
evidence of interest group pressure doubly difficult in the case
of South Korea. An important historical consideration is that, fol-
lowing the period of Japanese colonial rule in 1910-45 and the
Korean War in 19 50-53, South Korea was a country essentially start-
ing from scratch, not only economically but also to a certain ex-
tent socially. In some country studies, a partial solution to the
identification problem is possible by at least choosing groups whose
existence is not owed to the current set of economic policies. Thus
landlords or farmers with longstanding land ownership, or unions
with a long history of association, become the objects of study.
In the Korean case, this partial solution is largely unavailable.
The traditional Confuscian power structure from the Yi dynasty was
already greatly weakened by power struggles within the top or yangban
class (originally powerful scholars and officials with land ownership
rights), the dilution of yangban status through the sale of titles
and the emergence of a relatively wealthy, if not yet powerful, mer-
chantile class (Hahn (1975), Lee (1978), Korean Overseas Information
Service (1981)). Colonial occupation and war further acted as great
social levellers, and were reinforced by two major land reforms in
19 47 and 19 49 which redistributed land away from former Japanese
landlords and broke up larger peasant holdings (Brown (1973)). Thus
many of the groups which are easily identified today are precisely
those which began and thrived under the economic and social policies
of the last two decades, or at least have not been harmed by them.
A second consideration is the extent to which social and cultu-
ral attitudes of the Yi dynasty have survived,even though the Con-
fuscian power arid class structure has not. Paik (1978) discusses
these attitudes as they affect relationships within Korean bureau-
cracy, but the idea has wider application. Paik examines six dimen-
sions of the Korean value system - fatalism (including the desire
to avoid risk), familism (loyalty to family, birthplace, kinsmen,
school ties, province of origin), authoritarianism (a disposition
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to look down on inferiors), emotional humanism (where maintaining
continuous active relations with others becomes an end in itself,
not a means to achieve cooperative goals), ritualism (a disposition
to stick to customs and precedent) and anti-materialism (placing
more emphasis on honour, prestige, integrity and virtue than on
material reward). These dimensions can help to explain why Korean
bureaucrats might place a low emphasis on problem solving,goal at-
tainment and the modem organizational demands for impersonality,
impartiality, rationality and the delegation of authority; instead,
"rights and duties defined in terms of job description or job title
are meaningless because the actual power always lies in the hands
of some small clique formed around a powerful figure" (Paik (1978,
p. 223)). Similarly, cliques may cut across institutional boundaries
and the channels of power and influence between institutional groups
may not be those displayed on an organizational chart, especially
when those institutions are recent phenomena or have been borrowed
from western culture.
Finally, while the economic policies of the last two decades
have undoubtedly benefited particular groups, the overall record of
the Korean economy over that period would not at first sight provide
strong evidence that the favours accorded these groups have come
at the expense of the economy as a whole. Economic policy making has
4
encompassed two important areas of intervention, (a) in trade,
where tariff barriers, non-tariff restrictions or outright prohi-
bitions have been applied, particularly to imported consumer goods
(Hong (1979), and (b) in finance, where bank interest rates have
been administered at below-equilibrium levels, while available cre-
dit has been allocated to industry according to government-deter-
mined priorities (Cole and Park (1983)). At the same time, between
1962 and 1978 real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 9.9%,or
7.7% in per capita terms. Real exports grew at an average 27.4%,
Other areas have been left relatively free of interference or dis-
tortion, e.g. it is generally agreed that the exchange rate has
been kept close to equilibrium levels, at least relative to the
period of gross overvaluation prior to 1961 (Brown (1973), Hong
(1979)).
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not only giving a direct impetus to overall growth, but also pro-
viding the foreign exchange necessary for imports into capital for-
mation (with 19.7% average real growth) and, to the extent permit-
ted, into consumption (with 7.8% average real growth). Furthermore,
inflation has been kept at moderate levels with the CPI rising at
an average 15.0% during 1962-78, more than in Taiwan but less than
in some of the newly industrializing Latin American countries.
Yet despite this impressive economic record, the most recent
policy initiatives stress the need for liberalization in trade and
finance, motivated by a recognition that the interventionist poli-
cies of the past have, in at least some instances, created artifi-
cial market distortions and imposed a loss of static allocative
efficiency:
"... excessive government intervention in the private sector has
discouraged private initiative and efficiency of investments which
are vital to the growth of the market economy. Allocation of re-
sources among industries was not, by and large, guided by the market
mechanism, but rather, subject to priorities established by the
government. The result was a lopsided distribution of limited resour-
ces in favour of large enterprises and heavy and chemical industries.
The industrial incentive system was also ineffective both in promot-
ing balanced industrial growth and in inducing entrepreneurial ef-
forts to raise efficiency. Among the causes for this ineffectiveness
were excessive protection of industries in the form of import re-
strictions, high import tariffs and institutional barriers to entry".
(Economic Planning Board (1981, p. 8)).
Furthermore, there is a strong presumption in some Korean cir-
cles that those who gained from intervention did so by influence
peddling:
"A persistent and deeply rooted problem, however, is that of
corruption in the ranks of the government and the ruling political
party, particularly that related to collusion with private enter-
prise". (Hahn (1975, pp. 309-10)).
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"Perhaps more worrisome has been the reemergence of corruption
and favouritism and their possible impact on income distribution ...
Officials have been tempted to extract forced payments in return
for favouritism. The Daewoo group started with modest capital and
amassed billions within ten years. Illegal loans were obtained by
the head of the Yulsan group of companies to finance exports through
government influence. Moreover, the dominance of government over
economic policy in the 1960s and 1970s has invited abuse". (Jung
and Siegel (1983, pp. 48-9)).
Such comments warrant further investigation, which would be
of interest not simply as an examination of the role of special
interest groups in a centralized, authoritarian country. From a
policy viewpoint, it is of interest to know whether the interven-
tionist policies which have imposed at least some efficiency loss
were shaped or used by interest groups who exerted political weight
to override purely economic considerations. This would in turn
give an indication of whether those same groups, who may have the
most to lose from the current initiatives, are likely to use their
political weight again to block the implementation of these initia-
tives. Therefore, in Section II we review the literature on interest
groups in South Korea. This section essentially identifies particu-
lar groups visible in that country and notes the extent to which
they have lost or gained from the economic policies of the last two
decades. In Section III we examine the role of one group, Korean
big business, in more detail in an attempt to resolve the identifi-
cation problem - are the Korean chaebol (business conglomerates)
big because they are successful in a productive sense, or are they
successful because they are big enough and close enough to the cen-
tres of political power to obtain favours in the form of cheap bank
credit? Our findings, subject to data limitations and the difficul-
ties mentioned earlier, do not support the presumption that chaebol
This need not be the case. Elsewhere (Dee (1984a)) we show that
those industries which benefit most from cheap bank loans would
not necessarily contract, at least in the long run, were bank in-
terest rates to be liberalized.
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have obtained more cheap credit than is warranted by their economic
performance alone, although there is limited evidence that political
favouritism might have affected the use to which the credit they did
obtain was put. Finally, in Section IV we present some tentative
conclusions concerning the likely course of the Korean government's
current liberalization effort.
Section II - (Interest?) Groups in South Korea
The exertion of political influence on economic policy making
requires the formation or existence of coherent groups. In other
countries, such groups normally form within sectors which have a
common economic interest - the landed, labour or business sectors -
although coalitions of diverse interests can also occur. In the
first instance, however, we examine the landed, labour and business
sectors separately as potential sources of coherent interest groups
in Korea. The process of interaction between such interest groups
and economic policy making can then be represented diagrammatically
in Figure 1 .
On the left hand side we have identified sectors from which
groups might form to exert influence on government. On the right
hand side we have identified the economic variables in which each
sector has a stake. Where a group does form to influence government,
then government's choice over economic policies is constrained by
the policy effects on the associated economic variable. We have
included both the bureaucracy and the banking system together with
government as agents of policy making and implementation. This group-
ing reflects the power that bureaucrats and bankers in Korea have
to formulate or to exercise discretion when implementing economic
policy, but it is not a statement about their goals or objectives
when doing so. Thus we recognize that an individual banker may be
wealth maximizing when he accepts a bribe to make a favourable loan
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Figure 1 - Interest Groups and Economic Policy Making in South Korea
Sources of
Interest Groups Economic Policy Making Economic Variables
Landed Sector
Labour Sector
Business Sector
Military
Government
+
Bureaucracy
+
Banking System
Return to land
Return to labour
Return to capital
Output or value
added by industry
Unemployment level
Inflation level
allocation, but the course of economic policy is nevertheless
altered accordingly. For this reason, we have included the military
as a separate potential source of group influence on economic policy
making, since current military leaders no longer exercise direct
power over economic decisions but because of South Korea's strategic
vulnerability to invasion by the North, they might have a particu-
lar stake in the outcome. We now review each sector in turn to see
how it has benefited or been harmed by past policy actions and their
economic consequences, and whether coherent groups have emerged as
a result.
(i) Land Interests
At the outset we should note that the late President Park was
born the son of a poor farming family in rural Kyongsang province,
while President Chun was born in a rural part of Southern Kyong-
sang province (Kim (1981)). Yet on the government's side, a signi-
ficant initial step to improving the lot of the poorest rural far-
mers had already been undertaken with the land reforms of 19 47 and
19 49. At that time, both tenant farming and ownership of more than
3 hectares were prohibited by law, so that 39% of Korea's farm fami-
lies who had been tenants or landless labourers became landowners
while another 23% were able to expand their holdings (Brown (1973))..
In the early 1960s the incomes of farm and urban salary-wage earning
households were roughly equal, but the relative position of farm
households declined as industrialization progressed (Kim (1978)).
Government then responded on two fronts. From around 1970, the govern-
ment purchase price for rice, which had previously been set mainly to
smooth seasonal price fluctuations, was raised systematically above
the market resale price, while from 1968 both prices were increased
substantially through government restrictions on imports (Kihl
(1979)). Secondly, in 1971 the government instituted the Saemaul
Undong (New Community movement), a wide-ranging program whose aims
were stated in terms of Spiritual, Economic and Social Development.
The main economic goals were to promote mechanization and technolo-
gical innovation in farming practices, to expand the rural infra-
structure and to begin developing sources of off-farm income, along
Japanese lines. The government provided financial and material
assistance for individual projects, and above all leadership, occa-
sionally to the point of coercion (Kihl (1979)). Yet the keynote was
self-help, in that selection and implementation of projects was left
to individual communities, while the ultimate goal was to make the
rural areas self-reliant and independent of further government assis-
tance (Kim and Lee (1978)). The improvements in infrastructure have
been substantial and the introduction of improved rice varieties has
The government purchase price for barley, the other, main agricul-
tural product, had always contained an income support component
(Brown (1973)) .
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made possible yield increases of around 30%, although the attempts
to develop small scale rural industry have not always been success-
ful, farms remain less mechanized than in Japan and the smallest
holdings continue at a subsistence level (Pak (1980)). But by 1974,
farm household income had surpassed that of urban wage-salary earn-
ing households (Kim (1978)), and the incidence of absolute poverty
is now no worse in rural than in urban areas (Hasan (1978)).
Korean farmers have generally played a passive political role,
apart from occasional uprisings during the Yi dynasty and Japanese
rule. Those farming organizations which exist today are generally
the products of government-initiated programs and subject to govern-
ment direction or scrutiny (Yu (1977), Kim (1978)). There is no
doubt that the decline in rural support for President Park in the
1971 presidential election provided an incentive for the instigation
of Saemaul Undong, but in 1972, Park also instituted a constitu-
tional reform, since repealed, which effectively insulated him from
further electoral embarrassments and assured him life-long tenure
in office (Kihl (1979)).
Whether because of Saemaul Undong or the farmers1 traditional
independence, there does seem to be an acceptance, albeit grudging,
of the need for rural self-reliance. The current government has
begun slowly phasing out its price support programs, both to ease
the burden on the government budget and to encourage diversification
away from grains into livestock. Problems of the inefficiency of
small units remain, but the government seems willing to pursue the
Japanese model of developing off-farm income rather than pushing
for consolidation, partly because of a continuing concern over the
In 1981 the cost of all agricultural subsidies had reached 20% of
government's annual budget (Yoo (1983)). In 1983 the government
froze the purchase prices of rice and barley, but allowed 3% in-
creases in 19 84. The deficit in the fertilizer management fund has
been reduced by 76% since 1981, but subsidies are now being paid
to promote feed-grain import substitution. Rice self-sufficiency
has been finally achieved, partly through falling per capita con-
sumption, but the growing demand for meat has already outstripped
the capacity of Korea's livestock industry (Financial Times,
12 July 1984).
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g
reemergence of absentee ownership and tenancy. Nevertheless, the
concensus among policy makers appears to be that major assistance
to agriculture is no longer necessary, while the promotion of in-
dustrial growth in rural areas is as much to ease the burden on the
Seoul region as to provide continued growth of farmers1 incomes.
(ii) Labour Interests
In 1963, South Korea was still a labour surplus economy, with
almost two-thirds of the working population engaged in agriculture.
With a series of policy moves, including a major currency realign-
ment, President Park's government reversed the previous emphasis
on industrialization by import substitution and began actively
promoting the export of labour-intensive light manufactured goods.
By 1970 Korea had reached relatively full employment - official
statistics, which count as employed all those over fourteen who
work for more than one hour per week, show unemployment had declined
from 8.2% to 4.5%. At the same time, the agricultural share of em-
ployment had declined to about half. By 1977, when the government
had begun its switch of emphasis towards the heavy and chemical
industries, unemployment had declined to 3.8% and agriculture ac-
counted for around 40% of total employment (Hong (1979)). Indeed,
the main thrust of government's labour policy has been indirect,
promoting employment opportunities through industrial growth. Other
measures have included provision of vocational training centres to
supplement mainstream education, the provision of job placement
centres (largely unused) and the tacit encouragement of overseas
employment, mainly for seamen and workers on Middle East construc-
tion projects (Bai (1980)). South Korea has no minimum wage legis-
lation, unemployment insurance nor universal superannuation (Park
(1979)).
8 •
See Economic Planning Board (1981). Brown (1973) notes that 1967
legal provisions to allow the use of land as security for mort-
gages never became operational because of concern over tenancy.
Pak (1980) notes the adverse effect that absentee ownership and
tenancy can have on the incentive to invest. However, the 3 hec-
tare limit on farm size can be expected to become a more severe
constraint on efficiency as livestock production expands.
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Korea does have elaborate labour legislation governing the for-
mation of trade unions, the settlement of labour disputes, collec-
tive bargaining and setting minimum standards for hours and condi-
tions of work (Park (1979)). Yet Korean trade unions are largely
government-controlled institutions and are not effective vehicles
for voicing labour interests (Suk (1977), Won and Oh (1983)). Govern-
ment has the power to scrutinize union formation and to order dis-
solution, reelection of executive officers or changes in union con-
stitution where the union is judged likely to harm the public in-
terest. Unions are prohibited by law from using their funds for
political purposes (Park (1980)), while through an amendment based
on Korea's latest (October 19 80) constitution, most funds must now
be spent directly on welfare programs rather than on union salaries
(Financial Times, 12 July 1984). The procedures for settlement of both
labour disputes and contract violations are at best tedious, requir-
ing arbitration and extensive cooling-off periods before a strike
or lock-out is permitted, while strikes are legally or practically
impossible in industries deemed vital to the public interest, in
foreign invested firms or on US military installations (Park (1979)).
A recent amendment further restricts union operation to individual
companies and virtually prohibits outside contact, including legal
advice, during a dispute (Financial Times, 12 July 1984). Operation
of both the dispute and collective bargaining provisions has periodi-
cally been suspended (from 1971-9 under Park and briefly again in
1980 under Chun). During these times, employers unilaterally set
wage rates (Park (1979)). At other times, unions have negotiated
"relatively poor contracts" (Won and Oh (1983)) and have had little
success in establishing wage uniformity within or between industries
(Park (1979)).9
The ongoing emasculation of union power can be partly traced
to unions' earlier history of direct political involvement, first
as the main centre of. anti-Japanese sentiment and then as a group
9
See Park (1979), Luther (1980) and Koo and Hong (1980) for evi-
dence on wage levels.
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virtually indistinguishable from the ruling party of President
Rhee prior to 1961. Worker demands for higher wages are still some-
times voiced in anti-government street demonstrations,often ini-
tiated by students,rather than through normal bargaining channels,
and government fears of a coalition of political opposition have
led to suppressive action against both groups (Olsen (1980), Yoo
.(1983)). A second reason is economic - government is aware that
wage pressure can undermine Korea's international competitiveness,
as happened in 1978-79 once wages rose, first in nominal terms to
keep pace with government's own higher rice prices, and then in
real terms as expansion of heavy and chemical industries began to
create skilled labour shortages (Kuznets (1982)). The current weak
state of organized labour is indicated by union membership, which
fell from over 1 million in 1980 to under 800,000 in 1983 (Financial
Times, 12 July 1984). The government has begun to investigate the
possibility of including minimum wage legislation and unemployment
benefits in the next five year plan beginning 1987, but as part of
a general refocus of policy making towards social goals.
(iii) Business Interests
The growth of Korean business, like that of the economy as a
whole, has not been generated from a base of accumulated wealth.
The substantial industrial assets left by the Japanese in 1945
remained mostly in US, then Korean government hands, where they were
"largely dissipated by a combination of maladministration and war"
(Jones and Sakong (1980, p. 37)). Nor has business growth been based
on acquisition of existing assets from other enterprises - business
organization is viewed as a facet of the kinship structure and the
scope for expansion through merger or takeover has been limited
accordingly (Koh (1980)). Instead, most of the growth of industrial
10
Between 1974 and 1978, the Park government announced non-binding
minimum wage "guidelines", demonstrating at least some concern on
its part for the living standards of the poorest workers (Park
(1979)). But following the period of overheating around 1980, when
inflation reached 28.7%, the Chun government has been announcing
average wage settlement guidelines to control wage pressure.
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output since 1961 has been generated by the expansion of existing
firms, originally from small beginnings, or the establishment of
offspring firms, with ownership and control retained by a single
individual or family (Jones and Sakong (1980, p. 169-76)). The
largest, individual or family-owned conglomerates whose affiliates
now range widely across product and industry lines, are known as
1 2
chaebol (sometimes jae-bul). It is estimated that in 1975, the
largest 46 chaebol conglomerates accounted for 13% of GDP, 19% of
non-agricultural GDP and 37% of the value added in manufacturing,
a degree of concentration less than in India or Pakistan, but still
substantial (Jones and Sakong (1980, p. 266)). Furthermore, chaebol
have been growing faster than the economy as a whole so that the
degree of concentration has been increasing. It is estimated that
between 1973 and 1978, the largest 46 chaebol increased their share
of GNP at a rate of about 12% per year (Jones (1980)).
If chaebol have been growing faster than the economy as a whole,
does this reflect their singular ability to influence the resource
allocation decisions of government? Or does it merely reflect a more
productive use of resources obtained without the exertion of politi-
cal leverage? This is the heart of the identification problem men-
tioned in the introduction to this paper. Jones (1980) presents some
evidence concerning the sources of chaebol growth and the extent of
their market power, if not their political power. While there is
little evidence to suggest chaebol enjoy particular technological
economies of scale at the establishment level, they can at the conglo-
merate level exploit organizational economies of scale, particular
with respect to training skilled manpower (a lumpy investment in
human capital) and using entrepreneurial ability at the margin to
initiate new activities. They do not enjoy sufficient natural econo-
To date, foreign multinationals have played a minor role because
of strict government controls on direct foreign investment, de-
signed partly to avoid a reemergence of significant Japanese owner-
ship.
12
 Chaebol differ from Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu) in at least
one important repect, by not having control of their own bank.
Even when the Korean government began selling its shares in five
banks in 19 83, it determined that no single private shareholder
could take up more than 7.5% of a bank. The reason was to deny
chaebol the power of choosing bank management (International Herald
Tribune, 22 November 1983).
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mies of scale or command over cheap factors of production to mono-
polize the markets for their output, although each on average takes
the "number one" position in roughly one-third of its product markets.
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that chaebol have privileged
access to the cheap bank loans provided by the government-controlled
banking system, and that cheap credit, combined with high debt-equi-
ty ratios (also perhaps tolerated by government), has allowed their
rapid expansion on a highly levered basis. Again, Jones (1980) pro-
vides some evidence. The debt-equity ratios of large firms (chaebol
affiliates and others) were indeed almost twice as high as those
for small and medium firms(also including some chaebol affiliates)
in 1975. But by 1978 the ratios for all but the smallest firms had
risen to the same range as the large firms. While no direct compa-
rison between chaebol affiliates and others was possible, Jones
(1980) concludes that high ratios are more widespread than commonly
thought, while lower ratios for the smallest enterprises are con-
sistent with the greater riskiness of small undertakings. If indeed
chaebol are no more highly levered than other firms, their faster
growth could still be explained by privileged access to cheap cre-
dit. Information on the proportion of bank loans allocated to chaebol
is one of the best kept secrets in Korea, but the proportion is un-
doubtedly high. While the government has established explicit rules
or performance criteria for allocating certain types of loans, the
rules regarding allocation of remaining available credit are air-
so sufficiently vague to allow some discretion on the part of bank
managers (See also Hong (1979)). Jones (1980) notes that small firms
have no less of an incentive to offer bribes. However, there is some
evidence that larger firms in general could potentially bring greater
non-pecuniary pressure to bear,and at a higher level. In a survey
which excluded the smallest firms, Jones and Sakong (1980) found that
the entrepreneurs were predominantly the sons of the pre-industrial
(especially the landowning) elite, while their own background in
terms of province of origin, level of education and even educational
institution closely matched that of their contemporaries in higher
civil service positions. On the other hand, Koo (1976) found the
average education level of small businessmen (shopkeepers, cottage
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industry owners) in Chonju city to be lower than even that of middle
level bureaucrats/ while petty traders had the lowest average edu-
cation level, below that of factory workers.
Given the importance that Koreans place on education and the
benefits conferred by school ties, such evidence suggests that large
business might have an advantage over small in its access to and deal-
ings with government officials. Even so, it does not clearly "establish
that chaebol have greater potential access than large non-chaebol
enterprises. Chaebol dominance of cheap credit, if indeed such is
the case, could alternatively be explained by their greater ability
to meet the explicit and implicit performance criteria established
by government, or simply by the fact that government believes this
to be the case. Jones (1980, p. 118-19) judges that "Building a
shipyard and three tankers from scratch in nineteen months, as Hyun-
dae did, is substantially harder than getting the government to
provide the finance". In the next section, we present some further
indirect evidence on chaebol dominance (or otherwise) of the market
for bank credit. Here we pursue one further line of evidence in an
attempt to resolve the identification problem.
What is required in principle to strengthen the argument
of political influence is an example where chaebol have failed
to live up to government's general performance criteria but have
continued to receive favours in the form of cheap credit (or tariff
and licence protection). Were this the case, one might expect to see
the same company names over time on the list of largest chaebol. But
as Jones (1980) notes, the fortunes of individual chaebol have shown
1 3greater instability than would be typical in the United States.
Furthermore, at least one group appearing on the list of the top 46
in 1975 is widely regarded as an outsider, supposedly having purpose-
ly kept government at arms length (Jones and Sakong (198O),Olsen
(1980)).
1 3
He identifies reasons for the decline of 5 between 1973-78 as fol-
lows: one case of changing political fortunes, although open to
other interpretation; one case of managerial incompetence; three
cases of transition from firstto second generation leadership.
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Perhaps the most obvious recent failure amongst chaebol has
been the trouble experienced by some of those involved in the heavy
and chemical industry. Unfortunately, even this does not provide
clearcut evidence, primarily because the chaebol expansion which
occurred in these sectors in the mid and late 1970s and which pro-
vided much of the basis for their recent rapid growth was largely
at the instigation and encouragement of government itself. To the
extent that government subsequently extended extra support, this
could be construed as government paying for its own past mistake,
rather than as an instance of favours sought and obtained by chaebol
through political channels. We nevertheless briefly review the re-
cent history of policy moves in this case, judging them to be fair-
ly typical of government-chaebol interaction.
In anticipation of a decline in the comparative advantage of
1 4Korean light manufactures on world markets, government in 1973
set a policy of expanding heavy and chemical industries, then turned
to the chaebol as (willing) vehicles to carry it out. In the wake
of two oil price shocks and a period of domestic overheating which
was itself partly the result of particularly heavy private invest-
ment in heavy and chemicals expansion in 1977-78, the chaebol were
then faced with falling real export demand in their traditional mar-
kets, little demand, either domestic or international, for those
heavy equipment and petroleum products which had come on stream,
while at the same time they faced a growing debt service burden from
substantial domestic and foreign borrowing (Kuznets (1982), Yoo
(1983)). In May 1979 "the Ministry of Commerce and Industry called
for a meeting with representatives of the companies involved. The
meeting, however, came to nought because the represenatives did not
accept the Ministry's recommendation that some of the companies merge
or swap assets to reduce the financing burden and cut down the wastes
of duplication... The Ministry gave the companies a voluntary self-
adjusting period from June 1979 to September 1980. As many expected,
1 4
Korea has been facing increasing competition in textiles, for
example, from such countries as Malaysia and the People's Repub-
lic of China.
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no solution resulted. Finally, on October 7, 1980, the government
took dramatic action to alleviate the problem once and for all,
reducing the number of companies in each industry, eliminating
duplication of products and lining up related producers in or be-
tween industries". (Yoo (1983, p. 137-8)). When the sole remaining
producer of electrical generating facilities still could not manage
its financial and marketing burdens, the government's solution was
to turn the operation into a public enterprise, the Korea Heavy
Industries Corporation (KHIC), which subsequently took over other
troubled sectors of the industry. With the easing of world recession,
the government has recently given approval for expansion in selected
areas, has allowed some chaebol to again enter fields in competition
with others and has returned some activities of KHIC to the private
sector. KHIC retains the power generating equipment facility and
remains heavily indebted, although it is now entering production
of marine diesel engines in competition with a chaebol group (Finan-
cial Times, 12 July 1984).
Thus the most direct and obvious response of government was
to use one of the tools at its disposal, the public enterprise,
first to assume the most troubled portions of chaebol heavy and
chemical operations, but later also to reintroduce elements of com-
petition into the industry. Nevertheless, the government also in
1981 reversed a brief experiment in deregulation of interest rates
on commercial paper (Lee (1984)), the reason given to the author
being the vulnerability of the heavy and chemical industries to
higher interest rates, at least at that point in time. Furthermore,
the government has accompanied the recent removal of import prohi-
bitions on selected consumer products with generous tariff increases,
not all of which are obviously justifiable by infant industry argu-
Jones (1975) also notes the way that public enterprises have
sometimes been used to counter potential monopoly power of chae-
bol.
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ments. To the extent that these additional actions benefit chae-
bol, they are consistent with Jones' (1980) hypothesis that govern-
ment will grant a favour to repay a debt elsewhere. For this reason,
however, they cannot yet be interpreted as unambiguous evidence of
political influence directed from chaebol to government.
(iv) Military Interests
Unlike Japan, Korea has no long history of military influence
in government, since the Yi dynasty had neither the decentralized
system of manorial feudalism nor the expansionist aspirations to
provide warriors with an independent power base (Hahm (1975)). The
military owes its current importance to the Korean war, following
which the Korean peninsula was partitioned into North and South.
North Korea currently maintains an army of roughly 750,000 troops,
while the Republic maintains an army of 544,000, supplemented by
the presence of 40,000 US troops. Since 1953 there have been suffi-
cient incidents of infiltration from the North, together with assas-
sination attempts on South Korean leaders (the most recent being
in Rangoon, Burma in October 1983), to maintain the credibility of
a threat of imminent invasion. South Korea currently spends roughly
6% of its GNP for defence. It is estimated that North Korean GNP is
roughly one-third of the South, but that 25% is spent on defence
(Lovell (1975), Kim (1983)).
The interests of the military have undoubtedly been served by
economic success in general. In the original vision of President
Park, rapid economic growth played a central role, not only as an
end in itself but also as a means to achieve national security
16
The Korea Herald (3 March 1984) reports tariff increases on li-
beralized items from 20% to 90% for interoffice phones, from 40%
to 80%for handheld telephones, from 40% to 75% for vacuum clea-
ners and from 40% to 70% for men's shirts. Jones (1980) reports
that in 19 78, the top 46 chaebol accounted for 82.7% of value
added in the "fabricated metal products, machinery and equip-
ment" industry, into which the first three items would fall. Al-
though chaebol accounted for only 34.3% of value added in tex-
tiles, that sector was the primary source of Korea's initial
export success.
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against the external threat from the north (Park (1970a)). Rapid
growth has also played a role in achieving security from internal
threats, to the extent that rapidly rising incomes have satisfied
the high expectations of an impatient populace and stilled commu-
nist or other anti-government voices at home.
Furthermore, the military has contributed on an ongoing basis
to the economic success sought by ex-military leaders. In the ear-
ly 1960s the army provided an important source of employment for
surplus labour, particularly that migrating from rural to urban
areas. All Korean males are required to undergo a period of mili-
tary training, normally for three years. This process still pro-
vides an important first source of technical training for young
people subsequently entering the work force. The career military
widely engages in "civic action" activities, including assistance
to farmers during rice planting and harvesting and construction
of dams, roads and schools (Lovell (1975), Koh (1980)).Perhaps the
greatest contribution the military has made in the past, however,
will decline in importance over time. Beginning with the Korean War,
the military provided perhaps the first hands-on organizational,
managerial and leadership experience to an upper echelon who had
previously been denied it under Japanese rule. It continues to be
an important source of exposure to "modern" i.e. western goal-
oriented organization and ideas, thus contributing to the breakdown
of traditional Confuscian values which some have deemed harmful to
modernization and growth. Indeed, these factors are crucial in ex-
plaining why political and economic leadership arose from military
ranks following the Student Uprising in 1960 (Lovell (1975)). Today,
however, Korean business also provides organizational and leader-
ship training and is (perhaps) an alternative source of future poli-
tical leadership.
Thus the military has benefited from, and contributed to,
Korea's general economic success. But does the military have a
stake in the way that economic success is achieved, or is government
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free to make its own judgements on strategies for economic growth?
In the early 1960s, it was difficult to draw such a distinction,
since many government decision makers were drawn directly from mili-
tary ranks. With the growth of a competent, highly educated civilian
technocracy, which made itself increasingly indispensible as the
process of economic planning became more complex, the policy input
of ex-military leaders fell substantially (Jones and Sakong (1980),
Olsen (1980)). Olsen (1980) has argued that the perceived need'for
economic continuity was the main reason preventing the martial law
authorities from assuming a more permanent role following Park's
assassination. And while it is still true that retired military
officers are disproportionally represented in the management ranks
of public enterprises and may be rotated for political reasons with
undue frequency, this has not prevented government from acquiring,
divesting or even threatening to close down particular public enter-
prises according to its own priorities (Jones (1975)).
What stake do currently active military officers have in the
form that Korea's economic success takes? To the extent that mili-
tary hardware had to be imported, then an export oriented growth
strategy which provided the requisite foreign exchange was not
inimical to military interests. However, continued reliance on US
financial aid could have achieved the same objective. Of more im-
portance was the proposal in 1976 by the Carter administration to
withdraw US troops from Korea. In view of this, development of Korea's
heavy and chemical industries acquired additional importance as
the basis for a home grown defense industry (Lee (1980)). The Reagan
administration's recent assurances of a continued US presence and
access to weapons systems and military technology have relieved
the urgency, at least in the meantime. Two additional developments,
17
Clearly, the (ex)military is still an important influence on
government's political decisions, especially as regards treatment
of internal dissent. Kim (1981) chronicles the importance of
this political influence in the events leading to Park's assassi-
nation.
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neither assured at this stage, would further ease the situation -
a reduction of tension with the North through greater political
or trade contacts, or a greater role for Japan in the defense of
the region. Otherwise, Korea must probably contemplate the further
development of domestic military production capability as a long
term proposition.This provides an additional reason why the govern-
ment may not be willing to totally abandon the less successful sec-
tors of the heavy and chemical industry in the near future, and
further suggests that current assistance may not be solely due to
chaebol influence.
(v) Summary
To the extent that the centralized, authoritarian governments
which have ruled South Korea since 1961 have sought legitimacy for
their actions, they have done so largely by appeals to "the masses"
rather than by openly cultivating particular interest groups. What
they have offered the masses has been economic success, measured
in terms of Korea's phenomenal growth record over the last two de-
cades. Open association with special interest groups is in fact seen
by some segments of Korea society to undermine, rather than enhance,
the legitimacy of government. The reasons for this are both histori-
cal and cultural. Influence peddling and corruption were seen as
major flaws of the Rhee government which held power from 19 48 to
1960. In addition, some aspects of the Confuscian ethic which are
opposed to the "modern" self-interested pursuit of power or wealth
persist: "There is no inclination to establish an equilibrium by
depositing power in the hands of the rulers and then constructing
a "countervailing" force to oppose it. Korean would rather demand
that the rulers check themselves against greed and make efforts to
discover what the demands of the populace are in order to have such
demands reflected in their decisions... The elite status by defini-
tion signified a great humanness; and if an elite displayed lack of
humanness, the Koreans could be devastatingly rebellious and anar-
chically disrespectful of authority" (Hahm (1975, p. 353)). For
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those disaffected with or harmed by government policy actions, their
dissatisfaction is still expressed as much through explosive demon-
strations as through the power channels of interest group influence.
The instigators have most frequently been students, whose reasons
have sometimes been disaffection with economic policies or outcomes
(as in the "Y.H. Incident" in 1979 - see Olsen (1980)) but more often
disaffection with repressive political policy actions. They have
then often been joined by workers and others with a more direct
stake in economic policy outcomes. Such pressure, though not exerted
through normal interest group channels, has not been without effect.
However, it has not changed the course of economic policy making so
1 8
such as lead, directly or indirectly, to changes in government.
In their pursuit of general economic success, however,
cessive governments have implemented or maintained economic poli-
cies which have benefited particular groups. Foremost among these
has been the policy of regulating bank interest rates at below-
equilibrium levels, while allocating the available credit to parti-
cular business groups. It is widely believed that chaebol, the
large Korean business conglomerates, receive the lion's share of
•yi
such loans. It is doubtful that this policy was instigated at the
behest of business. Instead, the threat of credit withdrawal was
seen by government as an important method of controlling business
(Jones and Sakong (1980)). It is possible, however, that chaebol,
a subsector of business, have subsequently been able to use their
greater access to government officials in order to obtain more bank
credit than would be warranted by their economic performance alone.
If such were the case, it would suggest that the Korean government's
future economic policy choices might be more constrained than in
the past. In particular, it could further explain what might
18
President Park's coup followed the Student Uprisings of 1960.
Park's assassination,which paved the way for Chun's coup, was
the result of division within the ranks of his political advi-
sers, at least partly over methods to deal with student and
worker demonstrations during the worst of the 1978-79 economic
recession (Olsen (1980), Kim (1981)).
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be interpreted as an uncharacteristic caution in the current govern-
ment's implementation of its financial liberalization initiatives,
at least with regard to the deregulation of bank interest rates.
We now present some indirect evidence on the allocation of bank
credit in order to determine whether chaebol have been receiving
more than their "fair" share.
Section III - Chaebol and Bank Credit Allocation
Do chaebol receive cheap bank loans because they exert politi-
cal pressure? Or is it because they can, or are believed to be able
to, live up to government's general performance criteria governing
bank loan allocation? In South Korea, the government's general,
non-discretionary performance criteria are easily identified. The
entire focus of government economic policy making has been, and
1 9
continues to be, export and growth oriented. It is not necessary
for our purpose to examine whether this strategy has actually pro-
moted optimal allocative efficiency or maximized growth, nor whether
chaebol have used resources more efficiently than other business
enterprises. Export and growth performance are clearly the indica-
tors used by government to summarize any underlying economic objec-
tives in terms of efficiency or a possible growth-efficiency trade-
off. They are therefore the criteria against which chaebol perfor-
mance can be judged.
Data on bank loan allocations to chaebol are not available
directly. However, bank loan allocation by industrial sector is
available, as is chaebol representation by industrial sector. This
information, together with sectoral export and growth performance,
19
Even the policy switch towards heavy and chemical industries
in the early 1970s was apparently in anticipation of readily
available export markets for these products, so that the disci-
pline of international competition would bypass any "mere" im-
port substitution phase (Yoo (1983)).
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provides the basis for an indirect test of the forces governing
bank loan allocation. In formal terms, we propose to estimate
the following cross-sectional regression model:
where i denotes industrial sector i
B. measures the ratio of bank loans to total liabilities
1
 plus net worth for sector i
X. is the proportion of sector i's output which is exported
G. is the growth rate of sector i's real GNP
C. is the proportion of sector i's value added produced by
1
 chaebol
P. is the proportion of sector i's valued added produced by
1
 public enterprises
As defined, the dependent variable B. will be larger (a) the greater
is a sector's bank loan allocation relative to its overall asset
size, and (b) the smaller is a sector's equity, or the greater
is its debt-equity ratio. The dependent variable therefore captures
the two ways in which chaebol might be accorded favourable treat-
ment through the official financial system.
If bank loan allocation or lenient debt-equity treatment were
totally explained by government's general, non-discretionary per-
formance criteria, then the general performance variables X. and
G. would alone explain all of the variation in the dependent vari-
able B.. We would expect 31 and/or 32» t n e coefficients of X. and
G., to be significant and positive, but not 3-, the coefficient of
the variable C. which measures chaebol concentration in each sec-
tor. Chaebol might still receive more bank credit (or enjoy a
higher debt-equity ratio) than other,businesses, however, but
only because they were better able to fulfil the performance cri-
teria. In these circumstances, we would expect to see a high de-
gree of multicolinearity between the performance variables X. and
The explanatory variables have also been corrected for size,
where necessary, by appropriate scaling.
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G. and chaebol concentration C . If only performance matters, but
if chaebol nevertheless perform, the resulting multicolinearity
could produce insignificant.coefficient estimates for all three
variables. If, however, chaebol receive additional bank credit that
is unrelated to economic performance, then chaebol concentration
C. should have some explanatory power independent of performance
X. or G.. We would then expect B_, the coefficient of C., as well
as 3-, and/or 32/ to be significant and positive. Finally, we in-
clude the variable P., measuring the sectoral concentration of
public enterprise, so as to correct for any special credit treat-
ment of these institutions. Since public enterprises are themselves
instruments of government policy, they cannot automatically be
assumed to be subject to the same restrictive rules of credit allo-
cation as private sector enterprise.
The above empirical model of Korean bank loan allocation, as
it reflects a combination of general performance criteria and
special interest group pressure, is related to the theoretical model
of interest group pressure developed in Dee (1984b). In its simp-
lest form, the theoretical model demonstrates the commonplace that
when a single group exerts political pressure, it will receive
greater favour than it would under government's general, social ob-
jectives alone. This result presumes, however, that the benefits
accorded one group are not (completely) offset or nullified by fa-
vours accorded competing groups who also exert political pressure.
In Dee (1984b) we examine in more detail oligopolistic behaviour
by more than one pressure group and show that it can lead to a nega-
tive sum outcome in the market for political influence. Because of
remaining social and cultural barriers to government access in Korea,
however, we assume that it is reasonable to characterize chae-
bol as having a potential monopoly position, at least for favours
(if any) which accrue through the financial system. We therefore
ignore the impact that competing pressure groups could have on the
relationship between chaebol influence and the favours received. We
now summarize the data used to test the above simple model and then
turn to the results.
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(i) Data
Table 1 reports the data used for the explanatory variables of
equation (1) .The greatest constraint is imposed by availability of
observations on the concentration of chaebol and public enterprise
by sector. Chaebol concentration is taken directly from Jones
(1980), who reports figures for 1978 across sectors corresponding
to single digit SITC classifications, with a two-digit breakdown
of the manufacturing category. Jones (1975) reports public enter-
prise concentration on a roughly comparable sectoral basis, but
for 1972 rather than 1978. We choose 1978 as our reference year
for cross-sectional observations, but nevertheless use Jones1 1972
data for the sectoral concentration of public enterprises on the
grounds that 1978 figures would be not too different. The most im-
portant reason for difference is likely to be government divesti-
ture or acquisition of enterprises. Important divestitures were
made in 1967-9 and are already reflected in the 1972 figures, where-
as important acquisitions of heavy and chemical operations were
made in 1980, after the reference year. Nevertheless, there are
likely to have been some changes in the interim that are not re-
flected in our 1972 figures.21
Sectoral growth rates are measured as five-year averages over
the period 1973-78, on the grounds that growth is an indicator of
longer-term performance. Export performance is assumed to be a
shorter-term indicator, but because we wish to express total ex-
ports as a fraction of total output rather than value added, we are
restricted to input-output sources which are available only for
1975 or 1978. In Korea, allocation of some types of short-term bank
loans has been tied automatically to proof of current export perfor-
mance. This contemporaneous influence is already taken into account
21
One could nevertheless argue that credit treatment of divested
enterprises is not likely to differ greatly from their treatment
while in the public domain, at least when divestiture is recent.
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Table 1 - Data on Explanatory Variables of Regression Equation
Sector i
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fish
2. Mining & Quarrying
3. Food, Beverages, Tobacco
4. Textiles & Leather
5. Wood & Wood Products
6. Paper, Printing, Publish-
ing
7. Chemicals, Petroleum,etc.
8. Non-metallic Mineral Prods.
9. Basic Metals
10. Fabric. Metal, Machinery,
Equipment
11. Other Manufacturing
Explanatory Variables
0.08
5.54
24.9
34.3
73.2
9.2
38.0
70.1
22.8
82.7
Pi
0.27
23.29
30.81
0.41
0.09
9.91
22.11
0.61
13.53
10.73
Y(c)
i
5.7
12.3
8.5
37.0
39.9
5.8
10.5
13.4
14.5
30.3
Gf
4.04
7.30
11 .39
13.88
12.12
14.82
15.89
12.26
26.02
30.43
15.4 0.00 43.7 21 .23
12.
13.
14.
!
 15.
16.
17.
Construction
Electricity, Gas, Water
Transport, Communication
Trade, Hotels
Finance, Real Estate
Other Services
37.01
0.64
17.92
4.63
32.17
2.87
5.30
76.01
23.21
2.43
57.06
0.76
0.4
0.3
21 .8
9.2
1 .5
2.7
15.54
17.02
14.47
8.78
13.79
7.77
Notes: (a) Percentage shares of chaebol value added in sectoral value
added for 1978, Jones (1980, P. 36,38).
(b) Percentage shares of public enterprise value added in sectoral value
added for 1972, Jones (1975, P. 236-243 and P. 44-46).
(c) Percentage share of sectoral exports in sectoral output for 19 75, Bank
of Korea 1975 Input-Output Tables II, 1978.
(d) Average annual percentage growth rates of real sectoral GDP for 1973-78,
National Income in Korea, Bank of Korea,1982.
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in the construction of data for the dependent variable of our re-
gression equation, as we shall see. For the explanatory export per-
formance variable, we therefore use 1975 export/output ratios on
the grounds that a slightly longer history of exporting is likely
to influence the discretionary component of bank loan allocation.
The most obvious source of data for the dependent variable of
our equation is the Financial Statements Analysis (FSA) published
by the Bank of Korea (BOK), which presents aggregate balance sheets
for surveyed companies in each sector. For our purposes, there are
two problems with this source. Firstly, its coverage does not include
agriculture. Secondly, the reported data is subject to response bias,
at least with respect to the share of bank loans in total liabili-
ties. In 1980, for example, bank loans reported by all enterprises
in the FSA survey add up to 13,553 billion won, whereas the BOK
Economic Statistics Yearbook reports 1980 total bank credit out-
22
standing to industry at only 11,656 billion won. The reason for
the response bias in the FSA data is obvious. Given government regu-
lations which produce an excess demand for bank credit, Korea has
also developed an unofficial, unregulated (curb) money market
serving predominantly short term needs. Since dealings in the un-
official market are illegal or at best frowned upon, business has
an incentive to underreport loans from "Other Sources" and to over-,
report bank loans accordingly.
In Table 2, therefore, we present our method of calculating
observations on the dependent variable from sources which are less
likely to incorporate response bias. Since the BOK Economic Statis-
tics Yearbook reports directly the allocation of total bank loans
and discounts across industry, construction of observations on our
dependent variable B. therefore requires, in addition, an estimate
of total liabilities plus net worth for each industrial sector. By
22
Comparisons for particular industrial sectors reveal further that
the response bias is not uniform across sectors.
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Table 2 - Data on Dependent Variable of Regression Equation
1. Agriculture
2. Mining
3. Food, Beverage
4. Textiles
5. Wood & Prods.
6. Paper, Print
7. Chemicals, etc.
8. Non-met. Min.
9. Basic Metal
10. Fabric. Metal
etc.
11. Other Manuf.
12. Construction
13. Electricity
14. Transport, etc.
15. Trade, etc.
16. Finance, etc.
17. Other Services
Total
Notes to Table 2:
For column headings,
(1)
819.1
77.7
384.8
469.3
58.6
70.6
440.7
116.0
169.8
488.0
82.3
491.4
149.8
617.8
2876.0
994.2
522.7
8828.8
(2)
29.3
0.9
1.4
17.6
0.7
1.0
30.9
9.4
28.5
24.3
0.1
22.3
92.4
46.3
0.0
40.0
13.6
359.2
(3)
3.6
0.4
2.2
19.4
5.4
0.6
6.5
1.3
3.5
17.3
4.1
O.1
0.0
7.9
5.6
0.5
1.1
79.5
see notes
(4)
117.4
13.6
47.6
171.5
18.7
31.2
87.0
26.0
50.9
110.0
13.6
113.0
3.1
32.9
92.8
22.8
77.6
1029.7
(5)
668.3
62.8
333.6
260.8
33.8
37.8
316.3
79.3
86.9
336.4
64.5
356.0
54.3
530.7
2777.6
930.9
430.4
7360.4
(6)
368.1
11.5
17.3
217.1
8.2
12.4
381.9
116.8
352.5
300.1
1.3
275.7
1142.0
572.7
0.0
494.6
167.8
4440.0
(7)
40.4
4.9
24.5
215.7
60.1
6.3
72.4
14.6
38.1
191.5
45.9
1.3
O.4
87.7
62.2
5.4
11.8
883.2
(8)
618.0
71.7
250.2
902.8
98.1
164.0
458.0
137.1
268.0
578.9
71.5
594.6
16.3
173.4
488.3
120.2
408.2
5419.3
(9)
1621.3
152.4
809.3
632.7
82.0
91.7
767.3
192.9
210.8
816.1
156.5
863.7
131.7
1287.5
6738.5
2258.4
1044.2
17856.4
(10)
2647.8
240.5
1101.3
1968.3
248.4
274.4
1679.6
460.9
369.4
1886.6
275.2
1735.3
1290.4
2121.3
7289.0
2378.6
1632.0
28598.9
(11)
658.4
76.6
274.7
1118.5
158.2
170.3
530.4
151.7
306.1
770.4
117.4
595.9
16.7
261.1
550.5
125.6
420.0
6302.5
(12)=B.
24.9
31.9
24.9
56.8
63.7
62.1
31.6
32.9
35.2
40.8
42.7
34.3
1.3
12.3
7.6
4.4
25.7
(13)=F.
13.9
4.8
1.6
11.0
3.3
4.5
22.7
25.3
40.5
15.9
0.5
15.9
88.5
27.0
0.0
17.2
10.3
(1) Payments to Capital: "Operating surplus", trillion won, BOK 1978 1-0 Table, except for agriculture/ where 80% of operating
surplus has been subtracted as payments to land. Because of land reforms and regulations on farm size,
we assume mortgage loans are negligible and exclude land from assets accordingly. The 80% is arbitrary,
but produces an implicit real rate of return to capital in agriculture within the range of estimates
reported in Hong (1979). "Operating surplus" represents primary factor payments other than wages, de-
preciation and indirect taxes.
(2) Foreign Debt Interest: "Net investment income payments" from 1978 Balance of Payments account, trillion won, BOK Economic
Statistics Yearbook, which has been divided among industrial sectors according to figures on 1959-80
cumulative foreign loan inducement by industry provided by Ministry of Finance. Net investment income
includes royalties etc. associated with direct foreign investment.
(3) Export Loan Interest: Column (7) x 0.09, where 9% is 1978 interest rate on loans for exports from BOK Economic Statistics
yearbook.
(4) Other Bank Interest: Column (8) x 0.19, where 19% is 1978 discount on carmercial bills, call and one-year loan rate, BOK
Economic'Statistics Yearbook.
(5) Other Loan Interest, Dividends: Calculated as (1) - [(2) + (3) + (4)].
(6) Foreign Loans: Column (2) T 0.0809, where 8.09% is a weighted average of 1978 Japanese call money rate and London Euro^
dollar rate, weights taken from figures on 1958-80 cumulative foreign loan inducement by source pro-
vided by Ministry of Finance.
(7) Export Loans: "Loans and discounts of deposit money banks for support of export", 1978, trillion won, from BOK Economic
Statistics Yearbook, which has been divided among industrial sectors according to sectoral share of
exports frcm BOK 1978 1-0 Table.
(8) Other Bank Loans: Calculated as (11)-(7).
(9) Other Liabilities, Net Worth: Column (5) * 0.4122, where 41.22% is 1978 interest rate on curb market loans, average of
quarterly rates, provided by Korea Development Institute [Curb market rates also available in Cole
and Park (1983)].
(10) Total Liabilities plus Net Worth: Calculated as (6) + (7) + (8) + (9).
(11) Total Bank Loans: "Loans and discounts of deposit money banks by industry", 1978, trillion won, BOK Economic Statistics
Yearbook.
(12) Observations on Dependent Variable B.: Bank loans as percentage of total liabilities plus net worth, calculated as
(11) -f (10) x 100.
(13) Observations an Alternative Dependent Variable F.: Foreign loans as percentage of total liabilities plus net worth,
calculated as (6) * (10) x too.
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the balance sheet identity, the stock of capital assets in each
sector equals the sum of stock liabilities and net worth. As an ex
post proposition, the flow payments to capital also equal the debt
service payments on various types of loans plus a residual return
to equity holding. Total liabilities plus net worth can therefore
be calculated by capitalizing the various debt service and equity
return components of the sectoral flow payments to capital (taken
from the BOK 1978 Input-Output Table) by their appropriate interest
rates or ex post rates of return. In Table 2 we firstly separate
foreign debt service payments and interest payments on domestic bank
loans (both preferential export loans and normal loans) by sector,
and capitalize these by their associated interest rates. The resi-
dual flow payments then represent sectoral interest payments on
23
non-bank domestic loans, assumed to be mostly curb loans, plus
the residual returns to equity. These we capitalize using the curb
market interest rate. We are therefore assuming that the curb rate
can be used as a proxy for the rate of return to equity holding
in each sector. This assumption is reasonable in an ex ante, op-
portunity cost sense (See also Cole and Park (1983)) but may be less
24
so ex post. We then use the sectoral sums of capitalized items as
our estimates of total liabilities plus net worth for each sector.
Observations on B. are obtained, finally, by dividing sectoral bank
loans by these estimates. We also calculate observations on an al-
ternative dependent variable F., the ratio of foreign loans to to-
tal liabilities plus net worth for each sector.
(ii) Regression Results
Table 3 first reports the OLS estimates obtained for equation
(1), in which sectoral bank loan allocation relative to sectoral
asset size, B. , is regressed against sectoral export and growth per-
23
In 1978, official Korean non-bank financial institutions still
played a minor role. In later years, particularly from 19 80, our
assumption would be increasingly untenable.
24
Deviations of ex post from ex ante returns to equity across sec-
tors can nevertheless be viewed as a type of measurement error
which, because it occurs in the dependent variable of our re-
gression equation, will be captured by the regression residuals
but need not bias our results.
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Table 3 - Domestic Bank Lean and Foreign Lean Allocation by Industrial Sector for Korea
Dependent
Variable
!i
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
Ci
(vi)
(B.C.)
(vii)
Const.
23.019
17.693
20.561
26.477
Const.
-1.029
Const.
2.728
C.
34.475
Explanatory Variables
0.301
(1.799)
(0.092)
0.138
(0.809)
(0.432)
0.162
(0.868)
(0.401)
0.108
(0.639)
(0.535)
C.
-0.052
(-0.265)
(0.796)
Cl
-0.053
(-0.506)
(0.622)
X.
0.650
(2.085)
(0.056)
0.677
(2.057)
(0.060)
0.370
(1.114)
(0.287)
X.
-0.245
(-0.639)
(0.535)
Xi
0.470
(0.889)
(0.390)
(X.C.)
0.846
(5.609)
(0.001)
-0.271
(-0.386)
(0.706)
0.199
(0.296)
(0.772)
fi
1.043
(1.342)
(0.205)
Gi
1.439
(1.402)
(0.184)
(G.C.)
-0.334
(-1.361)
(0.198)
P.
-0.407
(-2.028)
(0.065)
P.
0.545
(2.350)
(0.037)
P.
-0.185
(-0.569)
(0.579)
(P.C.)
l l
-0.417
(-2.537)
(0.026)
R2
0.12
0.28
0.24
0.38
0.37
0.16
0.98
3.237
(0.092)
4.154
(0.038)
2.651
(0.093)
3.492
(0.041)
3.330
(0.047)
1.998
(0.164)
148.265
(0.000)
Notes; (a) Figures in parentheses are t statistics and significance of t. Where the
second figure is less than 0.05, the associated coefficient estimate is
significant at the 5% level.
(b) Figures in parentheses are significance of F. Where this is less than
0.05, the entire regression is significant at the 5% level.
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formance X. and G., together with the sectoral concentration of
chaebol C. and public enterprise P.. Regression result (iv) shows
that when all explanatory variables are included, they can together
explain a significant portion of the variation in B.. Neither the
two performance variables nor chaebol concentration are individually
significant, however, although their coefficients have the expected
signs. Only public enterprise concentration appears to influence
sectoral bank loan allocation. Its negative impact can be explained
by considering result (v), where we use the same explanatory vari-
ables with F., the sectoral allocation of foreign loans relative to
asset size.Public enterprise concentration, has a significant positive
effect on foreign loan allocation in Korea. The reason is fairly
obvious - roughly 50% of foreign loans outstanding throughout the
1970s were public rather than commercial loans and these were chan-
nelled directly to public enterprise expansion, especially in the
25
electricity and steel industries. Where public enterprises were
able to obtain their financing needs from foreign sources, their
domestic bank loan requirements were correspondingly reduced. The
negative coefficient of P. in regression result (iv) simply re-
flects this lower demand by public enterprises for domestic bank
loans. The result appears to have little to say, however, about the
way in which bank loans to non-public enterprises were allocated.
Does the insignificance of the economic performance variables
and chaebol concentration really reflect their unimportance, or
does it reflect multicolinearity between these variables, given the
significance of the overall regression? We examine the multicolinea-
rity problem from two directions. Firstly, we enter the explanatory
variables one by one to see whether the coefficient estimates dis-
play an instability which could indicate that multicolinearity was
a problem. By comparing regression results (i) and (ii), we see that
25
The public/commercial breakdown of foreign loans was provided by
the Korean Ministry of Finance. See also Table 1 and 2 for public
enterprise and foreign loan concentration by sector.
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the coefficient of chaebol concentration changes markedly once ex-
port performance is entered. However, the coefficients of both these
variables remain reasonably stable as growth performance and public
enterprise concentration are entered (regression results (iii) and
(iv)). Secondly, we regress chaebol concentration on the remaining
explanatory variables. Regression result (vi) shows that the result-
ing R is lower than when the dependent variable is regressed on all
the explanatory variables. Neither test, therefore, provides strong
evidence that multicolinearity between chaebol concentration and
economic performance is causing their insignificance.
How else can this apparent insignificance be explained? We
tested results (iv) and (v) for heteroskedasticity of the residuals,
using Goldfeld-Quandt tests applied to each of the explanatory vari-
ables in turn. While the results of these tests did not reveal any
heteroskedasticity in result (v) for foreign loan allocation, they
did suggest heteroskedasticity in result (iv)" for bank loan alloca-
tion. Furthermore, the variance of the residuals in (iv) was shown
to be related to the degree of chaebol concentration (but not any of
the other explanatory variables), and decreased as chaebol concen-
tration increased. In the same way that a positive relationship be-
tween error variance and a single explanatory variable can bias
downwards the standard errors of all coefficient estimates, so a
negative relationship can bias upwards these standard errors. This,
then, is a further potential explanation for the insignificance in
(iv) of not only chaebol concentration, but also the government's
general economic performance criteria. In regression result (vii),
we have corrected for this heteroskedasticity by multiplying (not
dividing, since our heteroskedastic relationship was a negative
This does not deny that some multicolinearity exists. The full
matrix of pairwise correlations is:
B.
C i
X i
G i
P.
B.
1 .00
0.42
0.59
0.20
-0.62
C i
1 .00
0.46
0.45
-0.23
1
0
- 0
X i
. 0 0
.37
.44
1
0
G i
. 0 0
. 1 0
p .
1 .0
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rather than positive one) all variables in the equation, including
the constant term, by chaebol concentration C . OLS estimation of
this transformed equation produces weighted least square estimates
of the original equation, where the errors associated with a low
chaebol concentration are given an especially low weight. Although
_2
the R of result (vii) is not strictly comparable with that of re-
27
suit (iv), the fact that the export performance variable now shows
as strongly significant is reassuring. The coefficient of chaebol
2
concentration (C. , since C. now represents the transformed constant
term) remains heavily insignificant. Our regression results of equa-
tion (1), once corrected for heteroskedasticity, therefore suggest
that while export performance (also public enterprise concentration,
for obvious reasons) weighs heavily in the allocation of all bank
credit in Korea, the sectoral incidence of chaebol concentration
does not have any independent effect, at least for those sectors
where chaebol have some minimal visibility.
(iii) Regression Postscript
It is of interest to examine the pattern of residuals produced
by the coefficient estimates taken from result (vii), where we cor-
rected for heteroskedasticity. By applying these estimates to the
original equation, we obtain a prediction for bank loan allocation
to the paper and publishing industry which severely understates the
actual allocation to this sector. This might reflect, inter alia,
recent government promotion of textbook production for education
purposes (see also Oh (1975)). In addition, we obtain predictions
for allocation to agriculture, other (miscellaneous) manufacturing,
transportation and trade which severely overstate the actual allo-
cations made. The overestimation for transportation and trade is
consistent with the Korean government's general tendency until now
27 2
A comparable R could be produced by recalculating residuals using
the coefficient estimates of (vii) in the functional form of (iv).
Result (iv) by definition produces the highest R2, however, al-
though result (vii) produces more efficient estimates.
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to stress commodity production sectors at the expense of services.
Furthermore, the overestimation for trade occurs despite Jones'
(1980) caution that his figure for chaebol concentration in that
industry is suspiciously low. Our feeling is that while the chaebol
trading company operations in that sector are highly publicized,
the sector overall is still dominated by small wholesale and retail
merchants.
While our results do not suggest that chaebol have received
more bank credit than is their due, at least where they have some
minimal visibility, a reexamination of the data in Table 1 and 2
hints that chaebol and public enterprise concentration might affect
the use to which that credit is put. Although we have noted that
the FSA data published by the BOK incorporates response bias with
respect to bank loans, we could nevertheless use the FSA ratios of
net worth to total assets in each sector to separate our estimate
of "Other Liabilities plus Net Worth" (column (9) in Table 2) into
its separate components. For example, in the electricity industry
the net worth to total assets ratio in 1978 is reported at 37.4%.
Applying this ratio to total assets (equivalent to column (10) in
Table 2) gives a net worth of 482.6 trillion won, and subtracting
this from column (9) in Table 2 leaves "Other Liabilities" for the
electricity industry at -350.9 trillion won. Similar calculations
give "Other Liabilities" of -5.7 trillion won for the basic industry,
but positive."Other Liabilities" for all other sectors. Although
the magnitudes may be questionable, the negative signs suggest that
these sectors have been net lenders rather than net borrowers. The
most obvious channel for this lending, at least in 1978, was the
curb market. Furthermore, similar calculations for 1980 suggest that
in that year, net lending might have been more widespread, particu-
larly in the construction industry. Such net lending in 1980 would not
have been surprising, given the generally depressed state of the
Korean economy at that time. It is suggestive, however, that net
lending appears to occur most heavily in industries with high chae-
bol and/or public enterprise concentration which, for this or reasons
of performance, receive relatively large allocations of foreign or
domestic bank loans.
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On-lending of bank or foreign loans through unofficial channels
at higher interest rates clearly occurs. Cole and Park (1983) hint
at this, while the most recent Korean bank scandals of 1983 involved
precisely such on-lending, with individual bank managers acting as
go-betweens for an appropriate "fee" (International Herald Tribune,
22 November 1983). So while our regression results do not confirm
that chaebol have used their greater potential access to bankers
or government officials to influence the amount of bank credit they
receive, our data does provide limited support for the proposition
that both chaebol and public enterprise enjoy greater leeway in the
use to which their credit is put.
Section IV - Summary and Conclusions
To the extent that successive military-turned-civilian govern-
ments in South Korea have, since 1961, sought legitimacy for their
actions, they have done so by offering general economic success to
the polity at large. They have not, in general, offered the opportu-
nity to develop unfettered democracy. In pursuit of economic success,
governments have followed an easily identifiable strategy. The
entire focus of economic policy making has been export and growth
oriented. This strategy has indeed produced a remarkable growth of
real per capita income, but in the process, some groups have clear-
ly benefited more than others.
There do exist organizations through which, in other countries,
those who were harmed (relatively) by government policy would exert
political pressure to improve their lot. Because of a culturally
instilled reluctance toward "selfish" advocacy, reinforced at times
by authoritarian government control, some of these institutions,
particularly the trade unions, have not been effective vehicles for
interest group pressure. Dissent has nevertheless at times found
expression through other channels. Some groups, particularly stu-
dents, have questioned whether economic success alone is sufficient
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to bestow legitimacy and have periodically agitated for political
reform. Student demonstrations have then been joined by workers and
others whose grievances are more directly related to their economic
situation. Pressure of this form has shown a remarkable ability to
trigger changes of government in Korea, but has had less demonstrable
effect since 1961.on the economic, policies of the successors, except
insofar as general economic performance was already faltering.
On the other hand, the government's general economic strategy
has clearly benefited (relatively) particular groups. One of these
has been the military. But while its interests have been served by
economic success in general, the military now plays only a minor
role in economic policy making and does not exert any major influence
on the way that economic success is achieved.
Another group which has appeared to benefit is Korean big busi-
ness, particularly the large conglomerates or chaebol. The question
then arises as to whether chaebol have benefited from government
policies, particularly government intervention in Korean financial
markets, because they have brought political pressure to bear to
manipulate regulation to their advantage, or whether they have bene-
fited simply because they have made a major contribution to Korea's
general economic success. An examination of the empirical evidence
suggests that chaebol have not been able to obtain more cheap bank
credit than was warranted by their economic performance alone, al-
though there is limited evidence to suggest that they, together with
public enterprise, might have been able to circumvent restrictions
on the use to which bank (and foreign) credit can be put.
Nevertheless, the Korean government is showing a somewhat un-
characteristic caution in implementing its current liberalization
initiatives, especially with respect to deregulation of bank interest
rates. Does this suggest that chaebol, who nevertheless receive sub-
stantial bank credit because they do perform, have been able to
exert political pressure to delay or block deregulation? At this
stage, a more reasonable interpretation would be that government is
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showing an unwillingness to burden some industrial sectors with
higher interest rates at a time when these sectors are still vulnera-
ble because of earlier, government encouraged over-expansion. These
sectors, especially the heavy and chemical sectors, are ones in
which chaebol are particularly heavily concentrated. Furthermore,
we have shown elsewhere (Dee (1984a)) that interest rate deregula-
tion, when undertaken from a position of initial disequilibrium,
would cause short term adjustment problems that are severe and wide-
spread enough to constitute a threat to economic performance in ge-
neral, and not just to chaebol. However, there are also long term
gains to be had, even for chaebol, and Korea's present circumstances
would seem to offer a perfect opportunity for deregulation while in-
flation is low, bank interest rates are at least positive in real
terms, and the extent of disequilibrium is probably less than at
any time previously.
In summary, our examination of Korean interest groups does not
provide strong evidence that economic policy making in Korea will be
any more constrained in the future by interest group pressure than
it has been in the past. We should, however, add a final proviso.
President Chun has not been exercising the same degree of personal
control over economic policy making as his predecessor. Decentrali-
zation of economic policy making authority provides an opportunity
for interest groups to choose between branches of the bureaucracy.
Furthermore, the Korean government is currently undertaking limited
political, as well as economic liberalization. Chun has instituted
a constitutional reform which limits him to a single seven year term
in office and has pledged to seek a peaceful transition and a wider
base of political support for his party before the next presidential
election. It remains to be seen the extent to which this support
will be purchased through economic policies.
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